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THE RUSSIAN CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES AND MONGOLIA t. Introduction 
The European Council in  Vienna .last December expre.ssed' its concern at the deteriorating 
economic  situation  in  the  New  Independent  States  (NIS),  particularly_ .those  with  close 
financial or trade links with Russia. The Commission was requested to provide a report on · 
these development;, including proposals on how to address these economic 'issu.es, not only 
within  the  framework  of the  existing  assistance  programmes,  but  also  through . the 
· Partnership and  C~-operation Agreements as they  co~c;: into  force.  This Communication 
sets out the Commission's analysis of the situation and· the response of the international 
. community, including that of  the EU.  ·  . 
'  Since last August,  Russia has been in a serious economic and financial  crisis. This crisis 
has caused a sharp loss in  confidence among investors.  In  the wake of the break-up of  th~. 
former  Soviet  Union,  a  large  majority  of the -NIS  have  remained  closely  inter-linked 
.  economically with Russia. As a result, they have been affected, in  some cases severely, by 
Russia's current financial crisis. 
In general, declining Russian imports and the sharp fail  in remittances from their nationals 
working in Russia are having a serious negative impact on growth and the current accounts 
of these NIS.  In addition, the economies of~ number of NIS, notably· Armenia, Georgia· 
and Azerbaijan, are dependent on-income from  remittances' of their nationals working in 
Russia. This revenue has been severely hit by the crisis and iri  some cases the pattern has 
even  beeh reversed  with  families  in· these countries  now  having to  support. relatives  m 
Russia.  ·  '  ·  ·  · 
Moreover, NIS budgets and capital accounts have been suffering from the collapse, of the 
Russian  b~nking system  and  from  the  re-evaluation  by  foreign  investors. of the  risk of 
.·  financing projects in the region. The efforts of some countries to defend the value of their 
.  '  .  .  \ 
currencies have exacerbated this critical situation.  · 
At first, encouraged by their political independence, affected countries tended to minimise 
the  impact of. the  Russian  crisis,  reluctant  to.  r~cognise the ·interdependence. of their 
economics  with  Russia.  This  has  considerably  ddayed  their  response  and· requests  for  · 
external  support.  Now,  s¢veral  months after the onset of the Russia crisis and  its ·initial 
impact  on  the  other NIS, these  countries  have  profoundly reassessed  the  situation  and . 
begun voicing their concerns. In recent weeks,  many pf the. NIS  have presented .formal 
· requests for support.  ·  · 
In  its  assessment- of the  impac! of the Russia crisis,  the  Co~mission has  analysed  the  _. 
situation in the other NIS according to a number of socio-economic criteria. Details of the 
impact of  the crisis on each country in the NIS and on Mongolia are provided below· and in  , 
Annex I. 
Agriculture.has been considerably affected in ·a number ofcountries. These difficulties are 
particularly serious in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. 
.  . 
In  the social sector,. fiscal  pressures caused by a slowdown in the domestic_ economics will 
. cause further cuts in social spending and, as a result,  increased poverty, which. is  already 
widespread. Through a ·combination of wage and pension arrears, reduced access to social 
services,  employment losses and lower remittances,  the  poor will  be hardest  hit· by  the. 
economic slowdown and are the least able to cope. As a rcsulf of growing social  pressure~ 
the countries may undergo a period of  political instability.  ""  . 
.  ol'- 3 __ The political and social. costs in these countries are expected to  be high, and pressures to 
reverse  economic.  reforms  and  return · to  interventionist  practices  are  intensifying. · 
Privatisation as  a whole· will be affected. Restructuring in the banking and energy sectors 
as well as reform in the social sectors are in danger of  being postponed or reversed.· · 
In addition to  close economic links with Russia, many of the NIS themselves have close 
economic and social inter-relationships. This introduces a serious risk of knock-on effects 
from one country to another.. For example, severe economic difficulties in Georgia have. an 
immediate, negative effect on the economies of  Azerbaijan arid Armenia.  ·  .  '  ' 
2  .. Effects of the crisis 
'' 
The Commission has  analysed the situation  in  the  NlS according to  a number of socio-
economic  criteria.  The  conclusion  is  that  Armenia,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kyrghyzstan~ 
Moldova, Tajikistanand Ukraine arc significantly affected by the Russian crisis. 
Armenia 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
The main immediate impact of the Russian crisis is likely to be felt on the social front.  In 
the absence of sufficient and rapid additional donor assistance, the Government may have 
.to  delay  planned  expenditure,  including  in  the  social  sphere.  The  Government  will ' 
therefore  face  difficulties. in financing ed'ucation  and  health care  ... An  accumulation  of 
public sector arrears is· likely. Private transfer and family support' systems have come under 
pressure.  This situation might result in a substantial increase of  poverty. 
The  Armenian Government' has notified the Commission that the most urgent needs  for 
.  additional assistance are. in the areas of  the· social safety net, education and. health care. The· 
Government has introduced a new benefit for vulnerable groups in the- 1999 budget and a 
special qenefit to  assist the most vulnerable· groups  t~ cope with the increased electricity 
tariffs: It has also asked for additional balance ,of payme11ts support in order to· reduce the 
pressures on the budget caused' by debt-servicing. 
Azerbaijan.  . 
Trade .related consequences· in. the short. term are less significant than in  some other NIS as 
. trade with. Russia has for some time· been severely affected by the political instability in the 
North Caucasus. 
Azerbaijan's  economic  problems  have  other origins.  It _will  only  capitalise  on  the  oil 
revenues in• three to four years at the earliest and is suffering severely from-the  depress~d 
· level ofoil prices which arc at their lowest levels for  1'0 years (the oil sector accounts for 
20% of the economy and 45% of fiscal  revenues).  A further major difficulty arises from. 
nearly one million refugees and' internally displaced persons on its territory as  a result of 
the  Nagomo~Karabakh conflict.  The  crisis  may  lead  to  a  reduction  in  social· welfare 
directly through a c'ut in expenditure. Government spending was cut in 1998  .. Further cuts 
in l999·wiU inevitably affect key social sectors. 
It  is · envisaged  that  existi'ng  support,·  inCluding  the  €  30  mill'ion  exceptional  Tacis. 
assistance over three years which was· agreed last year will be. used to deal with the effects 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A first instalment of  €  10 million of this. assistance has 
recently been disbursed.  · 
. '  4· Beiarus · 
· The Russian crisis is expected to have a ITiajor  impact on  Belarus, given  its hi'gh  level of 
dependence on  the  Russian  economy and the  poor economic-record of the ·Govcmmcnt. 
GDP and industrial production are declining rapidly. Shortages or basic goods have forced 
·the introduc_tion of  rationing. _Social provisions arc at risk.  · 
··The  poiitical  situation  in  Belarus  is  not  conducive  to  the  implementation· of Tacis 
'  .  .  . 
assistance, which has been suspended by the Co unci I, tl1rough the national authorities.  [t is 
therefore envisaged to continue employing existing assistance instruments, namely ECHO 
. ·and the Tacis Civil Society progr'amme.  , 
Georgia 
Russia accounts for approximately 30 %of exports from Georgia and is also a significant 
source of income through remittances from  Georgian workers. As a result of the Russian 
crisis and poor agricultural performance; GOP-growth for  1998 and  1999 was seriously 
affected.  The  most  visible  effect  is  the  decrease  in  traditional exports  of' agricultural 
. products to  Russia.  Moreover, the Georgian authorities,  as  those of other countries,  fear 
that '.the  food  aid  to  Russia _could  have  a  further  negative  impact  on  their  agriculturai 
markets both by substituting their exports and being diverted on to their home markets. The 
current account deficit and the impact on the balance o( payments arc  likely 'to be much 
larger than expected before the Russia crisis. The currency has already sharply depreciated. 
The· foreign  exchange market and Central. Bank interventions have reduced the country's 
reserves by J!lOre than hal f  ... 
- . 
Fiscal  -difficulties  have  worsened  in·  1998.  Salary  and  social  sector  arrears  have · · 
accumulated  further.  Privatisation  and  foreign  ~irect  investment  has  slowed. down  as 
investors'  confidence  dwindles.  Through  a  combination  of wage  and  pension  arrears, 
reduced access to  social  services,  employme~t losses and  lower remittances, the' poorest 
will ~e hardest hit by the slowdown: 
-- In  some parts of the country electricity supplies are down to  two hours a day.  Followi~g 
renewed  violence  in  Abkhazia  in  May,  Georgia .is  having  to  cop~ with  a~- additional 
refugee burden and is obliged to import electricity which had pre~iously been produced by 
the Inguri  Dam on the Georgia-Abkhaz front  line.  Th~re is  also a perennial shortage of 
medical supplies. 
President Shevardnadze. has  requested  specific·  support  from  the  EC  to  finance  the 
necessary energy' supplies  to  help  the  country through  the  winter as  well as  budgetary 
support to  alleviate the burden ·of salaries and  pension  arrears.  Energy assistance-should_ 
include  importing  electricity  from  Armenia  arid  heating-oil  from  Azerbaijan,  cout)tri~s 
·which are- also- f~cing a serious shortfall in expected revenues. Georgia also requires ur-gent 
technical  assistance  to  ensure  the  collection  and  management  of tax  revenues  and  to 
progressively ~liminatc corruption. 
Kazakhstan 
In the first six months of 1998, ~ore than one.third ofKazakh trade was with Russia. The 
impact ofthe Russian crisis on. Kazakhstan is being felt principally through a reduction In 
trade.  Kazakhstan has temporarily banned import of some Russian foodstuffs  which  are 
already  produced  inside  Kazakhstan  in  sufficient  quantity.  Kazakhstan's  problems  -are  · 
mainly  du~ to the current low oil prices as ·a  major, proportion of government revenues .  depends on the· oil  sector.  The Kazakhstan authoriti(.:s have expressed concern at tht:  fact 
_that EC food aid for Russia could affect Russian grain impot1s from Kazakhstan. 
Kyrghyzstan-
With almost 60 % of its exports going to the NIS countries, the Russian crisis is expected 
to have a negative, impact on growth in  Kyrghyzstan. The currency has depreciated.  Price 
liberalisation  for  gas,  heating,  electricity,  watet:  and  transport  is  now  threatened  as 
increased tariffs become problematic socially. Private sector interest for the restructuring is 
now likely to be further diminished, owing to higher risk assessment for the region. Overall 
privatisation may be slowed. Prospects for a strong foreign investment response are low .. 
There_ has f:?een  an  increase in pensions ~nd wage arrears. The budget has not been .able to 
fund key health expenditure, including primary health care and medicine. 
The Kyrghyzstan authorities have sent a  formal  request  for  special  assistance.  The .new 
Government  has  already  stated  that .  it  intends  to  improve  tax  collection  and  fight 
corruption, contraband  and  economic crimes.  Additional  support could be provided  for 
energy, medicines and food aid to the most vulnerable groups. 
Moldova 
The  main  impact of the  Russia crisis  is  being  felt  through  trade  as  half of Moldovan 
exports go to Russia.  Ma~y farms and agro-enterprises have been unable to pay wages for 
several months.  /. 
·The country is  one of the hardest hit with .sharply reduced growth, a rapidly depreciating 
currency and acute fiscal pressure. 
The reform and liberalisation process implemented by the new Government is threatened. 
The.crisis has sharply redu~ed investors' interest, hampering the privatisation efforts. The 
heavy withdrawal of deposits from  commercial banks is a serious setback to the financial 
deepening process in Moldova. 
Poorer households  and  vulnerable  groups  like  the elderly are  bearing the  brunt of the 
shock. For example, the basic pension is 36.5 lei  per month and yet it costs around 200 lei 
to  heat a small apartment. Wages and the already inadequate pensions are increasingly in 
arrears and arc  leading to  frequent  strikes m1d  protests.  Public expenditure on  the  soci<il . 
sector is much lower than planned·.  ·  · 
. The Moldovan Government was the first country to request special assistance to the EC as 
a result of the Russian crisis. President Lucinschi has setout in detail the country's needs. 
r Moldova has stated that it will be unable to cover essential energy requirements (coal, gas, 
artd electric energy) and social expenditure (hospitals, schools etc). Targeted assistance for 
energy supplies would bring substantial help to the social sector and could be monitored in 
an  effective  way.· In  addition,  vaccines,  medicines  and /specific  nutritional  elements, 
particularly for children, are needed, together with appropriate training of hospital staff. 
Food aid, medicines and hygiene parcels for elderly people living in the cities could also be : 
envisaged. 
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Mongolia 
Mongolia has  been  affected  more by the  Asian  than  by  the  Russian  cnsts.  Weakening 
demand for the country~s key exports- copper and cashmere:- have had a negative impact 
on ·the  state  budget,. much  of which  is  derived  from  taxes  on  exporters.  Shortfalls  arc 
creating some delays in areas such as payment of  state benefits  . 
•  I'  •. 
Tajikistan 
The  country· had  __ already  been  suffering  from  weak cotton  and  gold  prices  on  world 
markets.  In  the absence of additional donor support, the  fiscal  situation has  detcrior~ted 
further. 
A large share of the population is unable to meet its basic needs for food, shelter, clotning, 
he~lth  and  education  services~  The  civil ·war  has  caused  increasing  poverty 'and  has 
confronted the Government w.itn the difficult challenge of dealing with refugees, internally 
displaced persons (700.000) and the demobiliscd soldiers.  A recourse  to  salary, .pension' 
and  social  safety  arrears  is  a  distinct  prospect, . while  budgetary  support  for  the 
implementation of  the peace agreement will be weakened by the economic crisis. This will 
endanger .the  fragil~ peace and may exacerbate social te~sions.  .  · 
In  addition  to  the  local  political  problems,  the  Russian  crisis  is  seriously affectit:Jg  the 
. population. People will not be able to pay for  energy and essential imported goods. Food 
Security· assistance  already  granted  by the  EC has  been  blocked  for  security  reas~ns: 
Exceptional  financial  assistance has_bccn  agreed in  principle by the Council in  I 997 bttt 
_not  formally  a~opted  pending  implementatio,n  ·by  Tajikistan  of  a  macro-economic 
stabilisation  programme.  Following  recent  adoption  by  the  Tajik  authorities  of  a 
comprehensive adjustment and reform programme supported by the.IMF and the  World 
· Bank, this matter will now be reconsidered. 
Tacis technical  assistance· and the EC  food  se~urity programme to  Tajikistan have been· 
suspended since 1997 for security reasons, fo11owing the murder of  a western expert. Given 
the  ongoing insecurity  in  the  country,  the effectiveness of technical  assistance  remams. 
doubtful. 
Turkmenistan 
The  financial  impact _of  the  Russian  'crisis  on· the  Turkmcn ·economy  is  limited  since 
financial  markets arc tightly controlled  by·the state ·and  the exposure of Turkmenistan's .. 
banks in  Russia is very limited. Russia's financial  crisis as,such is  not expected ,to  have a 
direct social impact on Turkmenistan. 
Ukraine 
Ukraine's  _economy,  already  facing  problems,  is  closely  liQked  to  Russia's · and  is 
undoubtedly -negatively  affected by  the crisis of its  neighbour.  The presence of  foreign 
.  ··investors in Ukraine's financial markets has been reduced, the nationalcurrency has been 
de facto devalued. Foreign exchange reser-Ves have fallen below one month of  imports. It is 
~stimated that  in  1998  real  GOP contracted for  the eighth consecutive year and.  annual 
inflation reached 40%. 
. '\ 
The IMF has suspended the $ 2.2 billiori Extended Fund Facility to Ukraine, <;tpprovcd  in 
September 1998. Meetings are taking place to get the programme back on track. Following 
the Russi~n crisis, foreign inyestors are modifying the,ir risk assessment for the countries in 
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.•  ' the region and it is possible that their interest in  investing in  Ukraine and in particular in  its 
privatisation programme will further decrease. 
Wage  and  pension  arrears  are  increasing;  this  IS  worsemng  the  population's  already 
difficult living conditions. 
The Ukrainian authorities have. presented a detailed request for  EC  support amounting to 
€  6.3 million. 
Uzbekistan 
. The  impact  of the  cns1s  is· expected  to  be  less  severe  than  in  some  other  countries. 
Uzbekistan  has  gradually  been  increasing  its  economic  independence  from  Russia. 
Moreover,  banks have little exposure in Russia and  the country's financial  markets are 
underdeveloped. 
Russia is still a major market for Uzbek cotton and uranium'.  Trade in those prod~cts has 
only to a limited extent been affected by the Russian economic crisis.  · 
3. Response from the International Community 
3.1  Response of the IMF and World Bank 
The IMF and the World  Bank took the initiative in  conven!ng, on  11  December 1998, 'a. 
Consultative Group (CG) ai'ming  at  providing a  greater access to  the  financial  facilities 
they implement and at· convincing bilateral  donors to  increase their financial  support  in 
favour of  some NIS countries. · 
The  IMF  has  identified  six  countries  - ·Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Moldova, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - as being particularly badly affected by the Russian crisis. Ali 
six have made efforts in terms of  macro-economic stabilisation aJ?.d structural reform in the 
context of programmes supported by the IMF. The IMF asked the Commission to join the 
assistance effort. 
Increased  access  for  the  six  countries  to  the  IFis'  financial  facilities  constitutes· an 
important policy response to  the impact of the Russian crisis on the other NIS.  However, 
such resources arc limited and the six already have considerable access in relation to their 
quota. Hence, during the Consultative Group meeting of II .December 1998, the Fund and 
Bank  were  not  in  a  position  to  make  available  more  than  US$  120  million  additional 
funding in favour of these six countries and asked bilateral donors to  make an exceptional 
complementary effort.  ·  · 
3.2.  Response of bilateral donors 
Japan envisaged the possibility to provide additional support in 1999, but m~de  no pledges 
owing to the short notice of the above-mentioned Consultative Group meeting. The US is 
considering addit-ional assistance amounting to some US$ 30-35 million. Switzerland also 
expressed' its willingness to contribute in the order of  US$ 8 million. Russia mentioned the 
possibility of  additional debt relief.  · 
EU member states supported assistance from  multilateral donors and expressed their wish 
to  participate through Community instruments.  In  addition,  Netherlands and Sweden arc 
consi'dering providing assistance for the six NIS mentioned above in  1999. 
8 '  ' 
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4  The European Union response 
·Structural weaknesses in the economies of NIS  countri~s have been seriously exacerbated. 
by the crisis.  These structural difficulties include weak legal and regulatory frameworks, 
insufficient  industrial · restructuring  and  privatisation,  vulnerable ·currencies  and  poor 
revenu~ ~ollection. Remedies for these problems must be  provided througl1  the ccom)mic 
·.  reform policies: by the countries concerned .. The PCA framework and technicalassistance 
support under the Tacis programme pr6vide the best means of assisting· the NIS  in  their 
·efforts.  In-this context, the Commission appeals -to·the European  Parliament and Member 
States to accelerate the proc~ss.ofratifying the'sc agreements: 
The Tacis budget for  1999 has· been reduced by approximately €  60 miliion compared to 
·1998.  Likewise, instruments previously· employed in  the NIS  including the rehabilitation 
programme, inacro-economic assistance and food  security assistance to. the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, -have also been significariHy reduced since 1997. 
Further details are set out below on the instruments being employed in the region and how. 
they might best be employed to ·tackle the problems in  the region including the effects_ of ' ' 
·the Russian crisis.  ·  - · 
4.1  ~- -Macro-financial and/or exceptional financial assis~ance ·-
:::Macro-financial as.<;istance 
:This instrumenLcan offer flexible  arid  quick disbursing  facilities,  amf _it  is  probably the 
most appropriate instrument to respond to macro-economic external shocks. It has howcve'r 
important  constraints.  Firstly,  EC  financial  assistance  involving  direct  _balance  of _ 
·.payments or budgetary support,  is conditional upon satisfactory implementation of lMF. · 
·supported  -programmes.  Furthermore,  eligibility· for  macro-:financial  assistance  is 
conditioned  to  strict  geographical  criteria  and  several  NIS . (notabli Kazakhstan,, 
Kyrghyzstan,  Uzbekistan, _and  Turkmenistan) are unlikely to  benefit from  such  .. support. 
Concerning Belarus which is eligible in principle to  such assistance, the macro-:economic 
conditions are not presently fulfilled since the reform process in this co~ntry has ·long·been 
disconti_n.ued:  Ukraine already benefits from- a new macro-financial-assistance pa~kage.  (€ 
150 million) whi_ch  could be·implemented as soon as the refonn programme is  back:on 
.  .  \  __--.... 
track. 
- The Commission intends :also to propose shortl;  .. macro-financial·assist~n~e of some €  15 
million for  Moldova; taking into account the country's estimatcd,residual financing needs 
in  the' context of the macro-economic programme•,\that  the country will .. implement:with 
- IMF support. 
i  .: Exceptional financial ass~stance '  ., · 
In  the· cases  of Armenia' and  Georgia,  a  framework  Council  Decision .. for- exceptional 
.,.  financial'support has already. been adopted-(€ 265 million) in the form of a combination of 
·,  · ·Ioans::and grants to· be disbursed-over a-period of 5 to-6 years .. However;·full use,ofthis >· 
.,- ;:assist<lnce  could be made possible oniy if the·- Budgetary Authority confirms ·the gran·t 
· amounts  referred  to  in, the  current Council  Decision~.·  -Inclusion~ of Tajikistan  in  this 
· framework decision may .be envisaged on this occasion, ;since .this country now 'meets the 
·prior conditions mentioned in  the Council's  AgFeement· of.. February  1997.  This ·Would 
imply an increase of this assistance package by some € ·t 00 million through a combination · 
of  grants and loa~s. (see also Annex II)  · · 
9 4.2.  Food security assistance 
The Commission has been implementing a major structural assistance programme for food 
security aiming to respond to insecurity caused by serious food  shortages or food crises in 
developing countries in a post-emergency situation. Food aid operations of a humanitarian 
nature do not, in principle, fall within the scope of  this programme', except in the event of 
a serious food crisis.  The assistance is subject to prior agreement between the-Government 
of the individual country  ~m<! the IMF on  speci fie  measures in  the  field  of food. security 
(price policies, fiscality, ...  ) : 
The programme provides dir~ct budgetary support for agricultural sector reform in some of 
the  countries . under ·review:  namely.  Tajikistan,  An:nenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia  a~Jd 
Kyrghyzstan.  O~her eligible _NIS  are Turkllenistan, Ka'z.akhstari  and  Moldova. It will  be 
_difficult to provide additional support under this programme because funding is planned on 
a  multi-annual  basis and  financing' arrangements' for  t999 and· 2000 have  already  hecn 
made (€142 million)  .. 
.  .  -
The prompt im~lementation'  ~f  this as~istance  requir~s the fulfilmerit of  specific cori<,litions 
and  a  satisfactory track  record  of IMF  supported  programmes  but,  as  a  result  of slow 
implementation  by some  beneficiary_ countries  in .recent  yca~s. di.sb_ursement  of several 
instalments under this assistance has been delayed.  ·  ·  .  . ·  ·  · ·  · 
1!1  the case of Georgia,  a €  6 million inst<dment of a wider. food  security  package was 
.liberated  last  December  fo1lowing  a  letter  of President  Shevardnadze  committing  his 
Govemme~t.  t~ take  ~teps iri  order to  improve -fiscal coilcction  and  strengthen  the  fight  .  .  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  . 
against corruption. An additional €  4 million instalment is e}\pected to be released by  the 
end 0 (January. .  .  .  ·.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
For_Kyighyzstan an amount of€8,5 million has'been allocated for 1999: 
4.3. ·  Rehabilitation programme 
.  . -
The European Union has bt;:en .implementil}g a pr<;>gramme  focussing  on .rehabilitation of 
. dap1aged  infrastructure2•  Since~ 1997,  as  a  complement  t<;>  the  Tacis  programmes .the 
Council  decided that the rehabilitation programme should cover the Caucasus  c~untr,ies · 
and Central  Asia.  In  the period  1997-8, an  amount of €  20.5  million was allocated  for. 
· Azerbaijah,.Georgia and Tajikistan,  ·; 
- ' 
This .programme  has. the. advantage  of providing  dirc~t  investment  i~  i.nfra~tructurc. in 
..  .  .  .  .  •  .  -··  ,•  "  .  .,  .  '  -,  •  .  .-'  ·'  ...  ,.  .  •  .  1  . 
countries which arc suffering from  severe dcstructjon through  w~1r, civil disordcr.pr n~tural 
disaster with  priority being given to  the least developed among them.  Only developing 
countries are eligible i.e. Caucasus. and Central Asian countries; thi_s_ mean_s Jhat.Mo19ova, 
_  Ukraine and  Belarus cannot benefit_ from  this programme.  At  prese,-tt  the_ most eligible 
cou~tries are_,Azerb'aij'an,  (Je~rgia, _Armenia, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan.  .  .  .  .  ... 
. In 'I 997~ €  f2.'5  million was· mobilised for reconstruction and'  rehabilitation of electriCity, 
.. water supply, 'irrigation and niiiways' in South-west Azerbaijan (Firuli and Agdam region). 
.  .  .  . .  ' . :  .  ·.  . .  .  ~ .  .  . 
1 Council Regulation EC n° 1292/96 of27 June 1996, L 166, 5.7.96, P.  I 
2 Council Regulation EC 0° 2258/96 of 22 November 1996, L 306, 22.11.96, p.  I. 
10 Over 30,000 people are benefiting from  this operation.  Th~ majority of this population is 
Internally  Displaced  People  (lOP),  unable as yet  to  return  to ~their homes  in  the  areas 
affected by the civil war. 
In Georgia, the rehabilitation works will concentrate on rehabilitation of  schQols, irrigqtion, 
electricity systems (for example, the Inguri'Dam will guarantee an additional 8%electricity 
supp·Jy)  and  small  agriculture  proje<.;ts.  In  Tajikistan, the  EU  plans  to  contribute  to  the 
restoration of  more than 50 schools, severely damaged by the civil war .. 
In  1998,  a  total  of €  14  million  has  been  earmarked,  out of which .€ 4.5  million  for 
-Azerbaijan, €  6:5 million for Georgia, and € 3 million for Tajikistan more forthcom!ng. 
For 1999 a budget of  €  1  0 million is available.  Plans are drawn up to allocate these funds 
for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan.  . 
4.4.  Humanitarian aid 
.  . 
In _1998,  the most important humanitarian operation· for ECHO in  the NIS was Tajikistan. 
ECHO ·funded substantial food  and medical projects (worth roughly €  16  million) to  the 
victims  of the  civil  war.  Another €  11  million  was  allocated  to  the  continuation  ~lf 
ongoing operations in the three countries of the Southern Caucasus (mainly focussing on 
·refugees and IDPs).  For security reasons, operations in:the Northern Caucasus (Chechnya,. 
Daguestan) had to  be suspended in early  1998, although hurruinitarian needs in  the area 
persist. 
The continuing economic _cfisis has a.  majo~-impact on the living  condition~ of common 
peop·l~- all  over the region.  The_ .Russian crisis has however not created a  fundamentally 
new situation, but has rather severely exacerbatcd'existi,ng difficulties.-
ECHO carries out its operations via: humanitarian agencies (European NGOs, UN agencies, . - . 
Red Cross), The .number .of humanitarian agencies differs from country to country. In some 
countries there'· are hardly any potential partner agencies present.· 
Against this background, ECHO is currently revising its strategy in  tli~ region in: order to. 
adapt ·its instruments in an optimal way to the current needs:  In  particular, its contribution 
at current ieve1s for refugees in the <;:aucasus  ~nd,  Tajikistan will be maintairi~d: •  -.·.  -.  . 
- .  .  .  .  .. :  .  .  .  .  '  ..  - .•'  .  .  .. 
Following· a  request  from  the  Kyrghyz  government,  ECHO will  extend  its' m~dlcal 
programmes in the country throughout 1999 (medicine distribution; training; support- for; · 
local production of  IV fluids. 
4.5..  ·TACIS 
-,Ongoing assistance 
The current TACIS program~e  provides Technical Assistance aimed at bringing abo~t  _the 
~ransition to  a market economy and reinforcing democracy. For .example,- in  1997/8, the 
Tacis programme .allocated €  257  m_illion  to  the NIS  other than_ Russia  and-. horizontal 
-Tacis programmes. 
_Where  possible, ongoing Tacis programmes have been: adapted to  finance  urgent actions 
following the Russian crisis. For example, in the case of Ukraine  funds were allocated to 
reinforce sectors,: such as  the banking sector; ·more_ exposed to risks:  However, technical 
c  11 assistance has an  impact on the living conditions of the population <>nly  in  the medium to 
long term.·  . 
4.6.  ~pecial programme to help the other NIS most affected by the Russian crisis 
The Commission's assessment of the impact of the Russian crisis on the (lthcr NIS  set out 
in  this communication has revealed that Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikist-an  and  Ukraine  have  been  most  severely  affected.  The  Commission  intends 
immediately to carry out, where needed, an  in-depth evaluation of the urgent requirements 
of-these countries.  ·  · 
Should this evaluation conclude that additional  funds  arc needed to address humanitarian 
problems in these countries that have resulted from the Russian crisis, the Commission will 
propose to the budgetary authority that a maximum of €20 million be transferred for  this 
purpose from T ACIS to ECHO on an exceptional basis. 
In  the event that this evaluation identifies needs that cam1ot  be addressed by  ECHO, the 
Commission will examine the possibility of financing actions to address such needs within 
the €20 million mentioned above. These actions could be financed under T  ACIS, in  line 
with  the  ·provisions  of  the  existing  TACIS  regulation,  or.  under  other ·relevant  EC 
instruments. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Q~ite significant structural weaknesses in the economies of NIS countries still exist.  These 
structural diffic.ultics include weak legal and regulatory framcwilrks, insufficient industrial 
restructuring  and  privatisation,. vulnerable  currencies  and  poor  revenue  collccti(m. 
Remedies for these problems must be provided through the economic reform  policies by 
the countries themselves.  The PCA framework and technical assistance support under .the 
Tacis_programme provide the best means of assisting the NISin these efforts.  · 
In  addition,  the  implementation of ongoing other EC  instruments  (macro-financial and 
exceptional  financial  ·assistance,  food  -security  assistance,  rehabilitation . programme, 
humanitarian aid) will continue, where possible and appropriate. 
.  .  )  . 
Despite· their  independence," :the  NIS  haVe  remained  closely  inter-linked  with. Russi.a. 
Therefore, the ,Russian  crisis·:.has.affected· several  countries  althQugh  the  impact  varies 
considerably:  ~  .  · 
Hence, the Commission intends: 
: •  to make €  15 million available for,macro-·economic assistance tor Moldova~. 
.  .  .  . 
•  to apply the EC rehabilitation progmmmc.to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan; 
•  to release € 8.5 million· tor Kyrghyzstan under the, food security programme~ ' 
.  .  . 
, ..... 
•  to-continue hurrianitarjan assistance for example in  Belarus, Georgia, Kyrghyzstan and '  ~-· 
Tajikistan;  ·  ·· 
•.  to a11ocate exceptionally €  20 million under the Tacis budget 1999 to alleviate urgent 
needs in the most affected countries. 
The Commission's assessment of the impact of the Russian crisis on the other NIS set 
out in  this· cotnmunicatiori has revealed that Armenia, Bel<trus,  Georgia, Kyrghyzstan, 
12 
'·::'  ..... 
........... Moldova, Tajikistan arid  Ukraine h~ve been most severely affected. The Commission 
intends immediately to  carry out, where needed, an  in~depth evaluation of the urgent 
requir~ments of  these countries: 
Should  this  evaluation  conclude  that  additiomil  .funds  are  needed  to  address 
humanitarian problems in these countries that have resulted from the Russian crisis, the 
Commission will propose to the budgetary 11uthority that a maximum of  €20 million be  . 
transferred for this purpose from TACIS t(;  ECI 10 on an exceptional basis. 
In the eyent that this evaluation identifies needs that cannot he addressed hy ECHO, the 
Commission will  examine the  possibility of financing  actions to  address such  needs 
within  the  €20  million  mentioned  above:  These  acticms.  could  be  financ~d  under 
TACIS, in  line with  the provisions of the existing T ACIS  regulation,  or under other 
relevant EC instruments. 
/ 
· The Commission will regularly report to the other EU institutions on the development of · 
the situation in the NIS and will implement its actions in close co-ordination with. the IFis 
and other donors. 
13 ANNEX I 
Overview of the consequences of  the Russian crisis 
1. The financial crisis in the NIS (excluding Russia). 
Structural causes 
Although  the  immediate cause of current problems  in  the  NIS  is  the  Russian  financial  ensts, 
structural weaknesses in the domestic economies have dramatically exacerbated its impact. Even in 
those  cou~tri~s which  have  achieved  macroeconomic  stability  and  strong  political  institutions, 
transition to a market economy continues to .be hindered in several fields: 
Public finances 
The tax base remains narrow in the NIS, partly owing to the large proportion of the economy that 
slips through the net; the black economy probably accounts for 30-40% of  GOP in the region. This 
makes_it hard for government to increase revenues when the main burden  falls  on the relatively 
small number of  enterj:>rises which do comply with tax laws. Most governments have had difficulty 
in  mo-ving  away  from  their reliance on the  shrinking  state  sector and  towards  collecting taxes 
directly from-individuals and enterprises. Mor~over, general government expenditures remain high, 
at  close  to  40%' of GOP  on  average.  Thus,  most  transition  countries  face  persistent  fiscal 
imbalances, which are likely to worsen as revenues from privatisation will dry up over the next few 
years, hence making tax reform increasingly urgent. 
External side 
The  manufacturing  sector  in  the  NIS  tends  to  produce  low  value~added goods  that  arc  not 
competitive on global markets; considerable amount of  trade is done among the NIS, much of it by 
barter.  ·  ·  ,.. 
Those countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials,  including energy,  are 
particularly exposed to the effects of  the current crisis, as the loss of  export markets throughout the 
region could not be compensated elsewhere, which in  tum results in  additional needs to  rapidly 
finance rising external deficits. 
Financial sector 
The development of capital markets and financial institutions has been slow, hindering the efficient 
transfer of ownership and valuation of assets.  Many countries arc making slow progre;;s with the 
privatisation of the state banking sector, or have banks· that are heavily burdened by bad  loans. 
Efficient banking restructuring is undoubtedly key to the reform process. 
Unless action is taken by the international Community .to help weather the crisis, social and human 
costs in  these countries are likely to be high, thereby increasing pressures to reverse economic 
reforms and to increase government intervention. 
2. Direct impact of the Russian crisis 
Trade and currency effects 
Given  the  close  links  maintained  between  Russia  and  the  other  NIS,  the  Russian  crisis  could 
significantly reduce growth prospects. Variable progress has been made in  reorienting their trade 
away from other former Soviet states (FSU), but most countries remain largely dependent on  FSU 
-links (see tables below). As a direct consequence of the current problems, the NIS export share to. 
Russia and theothcr FSU  will drop. 
14 D1re.ct1on of Exports~ -
RUSSia  Other NIS  EU15. 
1997  1-7/1998  1997  1-7/1998  1997  1-7/1998 
[Armema  21.1%_  17.9%  19.3%.  23.9%  4.6%  4.1% 
Azerbaijan  . 23:1%  25.7%  25.3%  23.8%  11.2%  12.8°/o 
Belarus  64.5%  65.9%  8.8%  2.6%  6.6%  7.1% 
Georgia·  29~8%  24.3%  29.~%  25.8%  7.7%  19.1% 
Kazakhstan  33.9%'  39.0%  10.9%  7.0%  26.4%  19.4% 
Kyrghistan  22.0%  ~24.2%  40.9%  26.5%  5.3o/o  29.8% 
Moldova·  58.1%  54.8%  11.4%  5.2%  . 10.3%  '  13.3% 
Tadjikistan 
'  15.1%  11.1%  50.0%  50.0%  13.1%·  . 11.1% 
Turkmenistan  7.5%  7.5%  16.1'%  17.3%  .6.4.%  13.5% 
Ukraine  22.4%  . 
19.9%  11.6%  11.2%.  12.6%  14.8% 
Uzbekista.n  31.3%- 35.0%  22.2%  16.8%  16.9%  15.2% 
•source : Comm1ss1on Serv1ces 
D1rect1on Of lmportsw 
RUSSia  other NIS  EU15 
1997  1-7/1998  1997  1-7/1998  1997  1-7/1998 
[Armema  ...  12.5%  11.1%  5.0%  _2.4%  15.5%  17.6% 
Azerbaijan  19.1%  11.0%  25.2%  11.8%  12.6%  28.2% 
Belarus  53.6%  . 55.6%  13.2%  1.8%  15.8°/~  17.3%. 
. Georgia  13.4%  10.9%  23.0%  15.6%  21.0%  22.9% 
Kazakhstan  46.0%  42.6%  8.0%  4.6%  20.9%  27.6% 
Kyrghistan  24.1%  17.9%  34.6%  32.3%  11.7%  15.0% 
Moldova  28.6%  27.6%  .23.3%  4.1%  19.4%  28.6% 
Tadjikistan  '15.4%  14.9%  54.6%  44.9%  5.5%  6.6% 
Turkmenistan  13.4%  13.7%  43.4%  25.7%  1_1.3%  12.3% 
Ukraine ·  29.6%  25.3%  4.2%  4.1%  15.5%  . 15.4% 
Uzbekistan  19.9%  14.1%  19.4%  11.4%  18.8%  15.6% 
•source: Comm1ss1on Serv1ces. 
The currencies  of the  region  have  been  variously  affected  by  the  devaluation.  Those· of the 
'economies with the  strongest economic  fundamentals  (for example Kazakhstan)  showed only a·  . 
modest  nominal  fall  in  the  months' following  the  Russian. crisis.  However,  in  these  countries 
Russian goods will  become cheaper and could displace the domestic suppliers currently serving 
lo~a~ markets in some sec(ors. This will increase the level of imports and reduce domestic output. 
Again, this will exacerbate the existing trend for most- states, and increase the trade ·deficit almost · 
all  these  countries have  with Russia.  Since the  start of the  Russian crisis,  industrial output has 
declined dramatically in all these countries.  - ..  · 
The' Russian financial crisis provoked massive capital flight  fr~m the other currencies (Moldova, 
Ukraine), bringing an end to a period of exchange rate stability. Central banks .spent between 20%- · · · 
50'% of their reserves iri  supporting their respective currencies. The crisis ·is leading to a dramatic 
increase in the amount of trade conducted through barter. 
Soci~l aspects 
·I  15 The main immediate impact of the crisis is likely to be felt on the social front.  Private trans!Cr and 
family support systems are under strong pressure. This might result in  an  substantial increase  in 
poverty all over the region.  · 
16  . ANNEX II 
EC assistance to NIS (except Russia) 
in million € 
NIS  TACIS  97-98  Rehabilitation  human.aid  food security  except. & ma_cro-
financ. assist. 
·- 97/98  97-98  97-99 
Armenia  10_.0  3.7  28.0  58.0· 
/ 
Azerbaijan  26.9 
.. 
17.0  10.7  42.0  not eligible 
Belarus (1)  5.0  not eligi_ble  1.3  suspended· 
Georgia  16.0  6.5  12.2  42.0  165.0 
Kazakhstan  24.0  eligible  not eligible 
/ 
Kyrghyzstan  13.0  4.6 
' 
17.0  not eligible 
Moldova  18.0  not eligible  eligible  15.0 (2) 
Mongolia  11.0 
Tajikistan (1)  5.0  3.0.  31.6  8 (1)  ·proposed 
Turkmenistan  11.5  eligible  not eligible 
Ukraine  88.0.  not eligible  1.7  150.0 
' 
Uzbekistan  29.0  not eligible 
Total  257.4  26.5  65.7  137.0  372.0 
' 
17 ANNEX Ill 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN CRISIS 
ON THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES. AND MON(;OLIA 
At the request of the European Council in  Vienna last December a report on the · 
impact of the Russian crisis on the new independent states and Mongolia is made. 
.  .  . 
In  the wake of the  break-up of the former Soviet Union,  a  large  majority of the 
New ·Independent  States  (NIS)  have remained· closely  inter-linked  economically 
with  Russia.  As. a  result,  they  have  been  affected,  in  some  cases severely,  by 
Russia's  current  financial  crisis:  The  indirect  knock-on  macro-economic  effects 
coming  from  the  other  similarly ·affected  NIS'  markets  have compounded  this 
situation.  In  general, declining Russian  imports and the  sharp. fall  in  remittances 
from Russia are having a serious negative impact on growth and current account 
balances of these NIS. 
· The additional package f~r assistance would include: 
· •  to make €  15 million available for macro-economic assistance for 
Moldova; 
•·. to apply the EC rehabilitation programme .to Azerbaijan, Georgia 
· and Tajikistan;  · 
,  •  to release €  8.5 million for  Kyrghyzs~an under the food  security 
programme; 
•  to  continue  humanitarian  assistance  for  example  in  Belarus, 
. Georgia, Kyrghyzstan a:nd Tajikistan; 
The· report also makes a  propo~al for a possible transfer of maximum €  20 million 
.from  the  Tacis :  1999 budget ·line  (87  -520)  to 87-215 humanitarian  aid N  IS  and 
Mongolia.  The  transfer  to budget  line  87-215 will  only  be  proposed  after the 
· credits on  that budget line have been used and only. if necessary.  The eventual 
amount also depends on a further in-depth evaluation of the needs in  the  most 
affected countries  (Armenia,  Belarus! Georgia,  Kyrghyzstan,  Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine). 
The actions will be a carried out in the course of 1999. 
'The  normal  mechanisms  for  monitoring,  evaluation  and  auqiting  under the. 
respective EC instruments will apply. 
The recipient varies depending ori the projects formulated (NGO's, governments, 
agencies, ...  ).  ·  · 
In  addition,  the  Commission will  inform  Member States  notably via the .relevant 
Committees and the  European  Parliament on  the implementation of the special 
package.  -
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